Military-Backed Rule Blurs Hopes for Democracy in Burma

Burmese democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi (R) gives a speech to supporters of her National League for Democracy (NLD), with another party candidate Phyu Phyu Thin beside her, during the opening of an NLD office in Rangoon, on Jan. 17. (AFP/AFP/Getty Images)

Nearly unimaginable a year ago, the recent reforms in Burma—releasing political prisoners, allowing democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi to run for Parliament, loosening censorship, and holding peace talks with armed ethnic groups—have been widely lauded and even rewarded by Western governments. In the last month, the United States restored diplomatic relations with Burma (also called Myanmar), and the EU removed travel bans on top officials.
Yet the reforms are inherently fragile, supported only by good will, and not rule of law. The country’s less than democratic constitution and the lack of transparency over who is really governing the country, means that any change could be reversed at any moment.
“If we are saying we are going toward democracy, these undemocratic elements in the constitution have to change,” says Dr. Sein Win, Burma’s prime minister-in-exile, who lives in Washington, D.C.
Dr. Sein Win, a first cousin to Suu Kyi, is chairman of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the government-in-exile. The NCGUB was formed in the aftermath of the 1990 general election that Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party won by a landslide and the junta ignored.

Suu Kyi can initiate the changes but the president has to drive them. If he is not interested in these changes, it is not going to happen. But I think he is.

— Paul Copeland, Toronto-based lawyer

A guiding principle of the NCGUB is that once democracy and human rights are restored in Burma it will dissolve. That time has yet to come.
Under Burma’s Constitution—drafted by the military generals in 2008 and endorsed in a sham referendum—the military has an enshrined role in political leadership in the form of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), a permanent military institution.
The NDSC has 11 members, including the president, two vice presidents, the commander in chief, his deputy, and two speakers, and four key ministers—foreign affairs, home affairs, defense, and border affairs. The latter three ministries all go to the military, or “Tatmadaw,” effectively giving them majority voice in the council.

Moreover, 25 percent of seats in the national Parliament and regional assemblies are also reserved for Tatmadaw members.
And although the president appoints the commander in chief, the military chief has a strong say in ruling the country through his ministers. He can also suspend all “fundamental rights” “if necessary” during an emergency, although formally he needs presidential approval.
After the November 2010 election, the country’s first in 20 years, the ruling junta was dissolved and power was handed to a quasi-civilian government under President Thein Sein, a former general. The 2008 constitution also remains in place.
Win says the real power in Burma, therefore, is still in the hands of the army, which means that without the agreement of the commander in chief, nothing substantial can happen.
It is possible, the army supports democratic reform, but Win says without a real change to the constitution, those reforms can be reversed at any time.
“Only reforms are not enough—they have to be backed by law,” said the PM-in-exile.
Achieving this is what’s tricky. Tim Aye-Hardy, director of the New York-based Burma Global Action Network, describes the current constitution as intentionally designed to create significant confusion and a lack of consistency between the president, parliament, and the military.
“This is what they [the generals] have planned for so long to happen and I feel like the international community and Daw Suu are somehow compelled to play along with it.” Daw is an honorific affectionately used to refer to Suu Kyi.
Following the plan, Suu Kyi and the NLD are allowed to run for government in by-elections in April. Out of 664 seats in Parliament, 48 are vacant. If elections are fair, the NLD can be expected to win all of them.
Continued: Window of Opportunity