Shadow over Burma’s democracy

Please read a very good article in today's Toronto Star.

ျမန္မာ့သတင္းေဆာင္းပါးဖတ္လုိသူမ်ားအတြက္၊ ကေနဒါႏိုင္ငံ တိုရန္တိုျမိဳ  ့မွ Wed Apr 04 2012 သတင္းေဆာင္းပါး။

Published On Wed Apr 04 2012

Shan State soldiers perform during the Shan national day at the army's headquarters along the Burma-Thai border. (Feb. 7, 2012)

CHAIWAT SUBPRASOM/REUTERS

Mitchell Wigdor

Despite fears that irregularities would derail Burma’s by-elections, both President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi declared themselves satisfied with the results.
The by-elections were a triumph not just for the National League for Democracy opposition, but for the governing Union Solidarity and Development Party that proved that it could hold a relatively fair election, lose badly and respect the result.
Barring the unforeseen, the NLD will win the 2015 general elections by a landslide. As the nominal successor to the military regime that has ruled Burma for close to 50 years, the USDP cannot offer voters a compelling reason to choose it over the NLD. Will the military accept Aung San Suu Kyi as president?
The military is not delusional. It knew when it allowed the democratic genie out of the bottle what the end result would be. That is why one-quarter of the seats in both the upper and lower houses of the Pyidangsu Hluttaw, or parliament, are reserved for the military under the 2008 constitution. It is not likely to develop cold feet provided that the democratic reforms lead to a lessening of sanctions by western nations. The reformers must be able to demonstrate to the hardliners that their path can bring results.
Traditionally, the military has seen itself as the only institution capable of keeping the fractious country intact. Here lies the greatest threat to Burma’s democracy. For the government to have popular legitimacy there must be economic progress. The ordinary person must feel that life is materially better under civilian rule. But for the government to have legitimacy with the military, it must ensure domestic stability.
Like most former colonies, Burma’s borders are somewhat artificial. They do not correspond with the territory controlled by the Burmese monarchs, which rarely extended far beyond the central plains of Burma. The scope of the Burmese kingdom expanded and contracted with its economic and military might and the acumen of its kings in forging alliances with the leaders of the national groups surrounding central Burma. Even during the colonial period, the British did not exert unchallenged sovereignty over the entire territory.
The British overran Burma in stages, deposing its last king in 1885. They annexed Burma as a province of their Indian colony, but never conquered or exercised direct control over all of Burma’s frontier regions. It was only at the Panglong Conference in February 1947 that the Shan, Kachin and Chin minorities agreed with the interim Burmese government represented by Bogyoke (General) Aung San to join together to form the Union of Burma in order to expedite independence. National minorities under direct rule were denied a voice in the decision to consolidate all the lands east of what became India and Pakistan in into one country.
Consequently, since independence in January 1948, a recurring aspect of Burmese history has been armed clashes between the central government and national groups demanding greater autonomy, if not outright independence. Today, relative calm prevails. This peace was achieved somewhat through force of arms, but mostly through negotiations fostered by the same conciliatory attitude that brought electoral reform and the freeing of political prisoners. Under the 2008 constitution, a federal system of government came into existence creating local legislatures and an upper house of Parliament comprised of an equal number of representatives from each of the country’s regions plus the military’s quota. Despite the new institutional structures, disagreements remain regarding both the allocation of responsibilities between the central and regional legislatures and the implementation of the power-sharing arrangements. Some groups question whether the accords are being respected. Complicating matters is the fact that the national groups do not speak with one voice collectively or individually. Many in central Burma, in contrast, are uncomfortable with national minorities enjoying what are perceived by them to be special rights. Federalism is not a universally understood or accepted concept.
The government faces the challenge of turning the current tenuous peace into a stable and enduring one. Accommodation will be required by all parties to allow Burma to become a functioning federal union in practice, not just name, where disputes are resolved with words not guns. If lasting agreements cannot be achieved and the government calls too often upon the military to quell conflicts with national groups, the military may conclude that a civilian government is not capable of keeping Burma intact. Then, everybody loses.
In his reaction to the by-elections, Foreign Minister John Baird stated that Canada is ready and willing to help Burma build a better future. Canadians are experienced in dealing with the vicissitudes of federalism. Introducing the Burmese to concepts such as “distinct society,” “notwithstanding clauses” and “asymmetric federalism” may seem an odd way to demonstrate friendship, but helping to establish a more stable country might be a good place to start.
Mitchell Wigdor is a Toronto-based lawyer who has travelled frequently to Southeast Asia since 1984. He is author of the forthcoming No Miracle: What Asia Can Teach All Countries About Growth.