ဟီလာရီကလင္တန္ရဲ႕ ေတာ္ခ်က္မ်ား

ဒီအမ်ိဳးသမီး ေတာ္ခ်က္က ၉ ေလာက္ရွိတယ္ ။ သူ႔ရဲ႕ အုိဘားမားအစုိးရအတြင္း ရုန္းကန္ရပုံ တစ္ေလာက စာအုပ္ထြက္လာတယ္ ။ "The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat" လုိ႔ ေခၚပါတယ္ ။

အုိဘားမားရဲ႕ အိမ္ျဖဴေတာ္ ၀န္ထမ္းေတြဟာ သူတုိ႔ သမၼတဆီ မေရာက္ေစခ်င္တဲ့ အႀကံဥာဏ္ေတြ ၊ လက္ေတြ႕ အာဖကန္ ေျမေပၚက သတင္းေတြကုိ Berlin Wall လုိ ပိတ္ဆုိ႔ၾကေၾကာင္း .... အိမ္ျဖဴေတာ္က အရာရွိေတြဟာ အာဖကန္က အေမရိကန္ သံအမတ္နဲ႔ တပ္ခ်ဳပ္ကုိ အိမ္ျဖဴေတာ္ ကုိသာ တုိက္ရုိက္သတင္းေပးပုိ႔ဖုိ႔ ညႊန္ၾကားခဲ့ေၾကာင္း ....

ဒါေပမယ့္ ကလင္တန္ဟာ ဒီရာထူးကုိ မယူမည္ သေဘာတူခဲ့တဲ့ ကတိက၀တ္ေၾကာင့္ အုိဘားမားႏွင့္ အပတ္စဥ္ အလ်ဥ္းသင့္သလုိ ႏွစ္ဦးတည္း သီးသန္႔ေတြ႕ဆုံခြင့္ ရွိေၾကာင္း .... ကလင္တန္ရဲ႕ ႀကိဳးပမ္းမႈ ၊ ထက္ျမက္မႈ တုိ႔ေၾကာင့္သာ အာဖကန္မွ အေမရိကန္တပ္ေတြ ေစာလ်င္စြာ ထြက္ခြာႏုိင္ဖုိ႔ အေျခအေနေပၚေပါက္လာတာ ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ..... ႏုိ႔မဟုတ္ရင္ State Dept. ဟာ အိမ္ျဖဴေတာ္က အနီးကပ္ ၀န္ထမ္းေတြေၾကာင့္ ေျမာင္းထဲကုိ ေရာက္သြားမွာ ျဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ..... အစရွိသည္ျဖင့္ သံတမန္တစ္ဦးက အဆုိပါ စာအုပ္မွာ ေရးသားထားပါတယ္ ။

(မွတ္ခ်က္ - ႏုိင္ငံေရးသမားမ်ား ႏုိင္ငံေရးပါး၀ႏုိင္ၾကပါေစ ....)

www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/1257910/1/.html

 

Ex-US official reveals war over Afghan policy Posted: 05 March 2013 0753 hrs

	US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks to the press on January 18, 2013. (AFP/File/Nicholas Kamm)

WASHINGTON: Former US top diplomat Hillary Clinton and her staff fought "tooth and nail" to push ideas for diplomacy in Afghanistan in a bitter turf war with the White House, an ex-official says in a new book.

Vali Nasr, now dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, was an advisor to Richard Holbrooke, the special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan until his death in 2010.

US President Barack Obama inherited the legacy of the 2001 US-invasion of Afghanistan and vowed to wind down the war when he entered the White House.

But in an excerpt from his new book, "The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat," Nasr says "my time in the Obama administration turned out to be a deeply disillusioning experience."

Clinton, who stepped down after four years as secretary of state in January, whenever possible went directly to Obama in regular private weekly meetings which she had insisted on as a condition for taking the job.

That allowed her to get "around the so-called Berlin Wall of staffers who shielded Obama from any option or idea they did not want him to consider," Nasr wrote in the excerpt in the online Foreign Policy magazine Monday.

"Clinton got along well with Obama, but on Afghanistan and Pakistan the State Department had to fight tooth and nail just to have a hearing at the White House," he said.

"Had it not been for Clinton's tenacity and the respect she commanded, the State Department would have had no influence on policymaking whatsoever."

Specifically, Clinton pushed Holbrook's idea that Washington should be trying to facilitate reconciliation talks with the Taliban as a way of ending the Afghan conflict.

White House staffers had been suspicious of Holbrooke, and blocked the idea worried that Taliban talks would only expand his influence, he said.

And the military thought that talk of political reconciliation as a path out of Afghanistan would only undermine an effective counter-insurgency strategy.

"The White House encouraged the US ambassadors in Afghanistan and Pakistan to go around the State Department and work with the White House directly, undermining their own agency," he alleged.

"Those ambassadors quickly learned how easy it was to manipulate the administration's animus toward Holbrooke to their own advantage."

State Department deputy acting spokesman Patrick Ventrell Monday refused to discuss the book, but said "we make our input" adding his department had "an excellent working relationship with the White House."

"We really stand behind the record of the progress we've made in Afghanistan, but beyond that, I'm not going to get into interagency discussion."

Nasr however describes a bitter battle to coax the White House around to the idea of Taliban reconciliation talks, which took more than a year of lobbying.

"Victories for the State Department were few and hard fought," he writes.

"It was little consolation that its recommendations on reconciliation with the Taliban or regional diplomacy to end the Afghan war eventually became official policy -- after the White House exhausted the alternatives."

- AFP/jc